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A B S T R A C T
To investigate the neural preparation and awareness of an intention to act, neuroscientists typically examine
spontaneous movements: self-paced flexions of the hand or foot. However, these movements may not present a
straightforward case of intended action as they are performed in absence of reasons to act and without the
evaluation of action consequences. Therefore, a common criticism of these studies is that they lack ecological
validity, because the results do not generalize to the more societally relevant deliberate actions that we perform
in daily life. We agree that research on intended action should include reason-based deliberate actions in order to
be more relevant for debates about human agency and free will. Therefore, we have developed a computer game
called “Free Wally”, which invites players to perform deliberate actions to achieve a goal. Free Wally provides a
controlled environment for studying deliberate intended action, by presenting information for deciding whether
or not to act, what action to perform and when to perform it, incorporating all basic components of an ecolo-
gically valid intended act. As a first step to validate our setup, we compare this game to a second computer game
that measures spontaneous actions in a traditional way. While playing either game, the timing of the experienced
intentions to act is measured using a real-time probing method. Moreover, the neural preparation for action is
measured in terms of the (lateralized) readiness potential and alpha/beta event-related desynchronization across
the motor cortex. No differences were found between the games in these last stages of action preparation,
suggesting that the Free Wally game can be used to study intended action. However, differences in earlier stages
during intention formation are to be expected. With Free Wally as a tool, we hope to encourage further research
into the formation and content of ecologically valid motor intentions.
1. Introduction
Research on the relation between the neural preparation and sub-
jective experience of an intention to act focuses mostly on one type of
action: spontaneous movement. Specifically, self-paced wrist exten-
sions, finger flexions or button presses (for an overview: see Saigle
et al., 2018). Although some studies investigate spontaneous decisions
rather than movements (e.g. Bode et al., 2013; Soon et al., 2013), it is
the general element of spontaneity that seems most important for ac-
tions to be considered free (Deutschländer et al., 2017; Haggard, 2019).
However, it is also the element of spontaneity that makes these actions
most trivial (Banks and Pockett, 2007). Imagine you are a participant in
a Libet-type experiment (Libet et al., 1983). You are instructed to
perform a self-paced wrist extension whenever you feel the intention to
do so. As soon as you notice an intention to move, you are asked to
remember and report the configuration of a clock that is in front of you.
As you may notice, this task feels quite artificial. There are no apparent
reasons to perform the action, other than to follow the experimental
instructions. Moreover, action performance has no noticeable effect on
the environment, nor does it involve any consequences that can be
evaluated and experienced by the actor or others. When asking for the
motivations behind such acts, one receives no further explanations
other than ‘I just wanted to’ or simply a shrug. This is not the type of
action about which societally relevant questions regarding responsi-
bility, accountability, or even free will, will be raised (Nachev and
Hacker, 2014; Mecacci and Haselager, 2015).
The spontaneous actions measured by neuroscience research are not
the most straightforward cases of intended action. Besides the lack of
reasons and consequences, it is questionable whether these actions
would be preceded by a consciously experienced intention in daily life.
Therefore, the reported intention onsets in Libet-type experiments may
relate more to the onset of an urge than an intention to act (Mele, 2010;
Roskies, 2011). For these reasons, neuroscience experiments on in-
tended action have often been criticized about whether their results will
hold for the more complex and deliberate actions that we may perform
in daily life (Radder and Meynen, 2013; Saigle et al., 2018).
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1.1. Requirements for deliberate intended action
In order to study deliberate intended action in an ecologically valid
way, we suggest the following aspects should be represented in an ex-
periment:
1. A goal: something you want to achieve. Your actions are an attempt
to reach that goal.
2. A strategy: the course of action by which you can achieve your goal.
3. Some type of deliberation: inference based on relevant stimuli,
leading up to a decision to act. We consider actions to be free when
there are reasons for acting, but these reasons do not compel one to
do anything in particular (Mecacci and Haselager, 2015).
4. An intention: being or becoming committed to an act. In daily life,
intended actions usually involve three components: we need to de-
cide what we want to do, when we want to do it and whether or not
we still want or can do it when the time comes (Brass and Haggard,
2008).
5. An action: e.g. an intended movement. Immediate actions are per-
formed as soon as the intention to act arises. With planned actions,
there is some time between the intention to act and the action
performance.
6. A certain outcome: the change in the environment caused by the
action.
7. The consequences of the achieved outcome: the impact of the out-
come. Certain outcomes can lead to consequences that could evoke
an evaluative or emotional experience, such as a sense of achieve-
ment or failure, or pride or shame.
Each of these aspects can involve a sense of responsibility. For in-
stance, a person is responsible for setting their own goal and for se-
lecting, evaluating and executing a strategy to achieve that goal. We
believe that these elements are required for experiments measuring
deliberate intended actions to be considered ecologically valid and
therefore societally relevant. One needs to perform experiments in-
cluding these factors to validate that they do not invalidate the con-
clusions of less ecologically valid experiments.
1.2. Free Wally
We have implemented each of these elements in a computer game
called “Free Wally”. Free Wally allows players to perform intended
actions to achieve a goal: free a whale that is held captive on top of a
hill. Stimuli provide reasons to act and actions have consequences, in-
creasing the ecological validity of the measured actions. The game of-
fers a choice of what action to perform, when to perform it and whether
to execute it, incorporating all components of an intention (Brass and
Haggard, 2008). Although external stimuli play a role in the develop-
ment of an intention to move, commitment to an intention is based
primarily on the player's own initiative. This type of intention involves
the availability of options to the player about what to do, and requires a
decision (Mele, 2007). It is this type of intended action for which a
person can explicitly formulate why they chose to behave a certain way,
including evaluations of the intention, the act and its outcomes.
Moreover, it is this type of action that we consider most important for
our feeling of agency and free will (Roskies, 2011; Mecacci and
Haselager, 2015).
Distinctive neural activities have been found predictive of, or cor-
related with, the what, when and whether components or phases (as ar-
gued in Verbaarschot et al., 2016) of intended action (Brass et al., 2013;
Zapparoli et al., 2017). These distinct activities are usually identified by
allowing the freedom to decide on only one out of three decisions, e.g.
contrasting self-paced button presses of the right hand (fixed whether
and what, free when) with spontaneous left and right hand button
presses at a cued moment in time (fixed whether and when, free what)
(Krieghoff et al., 2009; Hoffstaedter et al., 2012). The task that a
participant needs to perform in this type of experiment is often quite
artificial, e.g. intend to press a button with your right hand and at the
last possible moment in time, veto your act (Brass and Haggard, 2007).
In daily life, we usually decide on all three what, when and whether
components prior to an intended act. Moreover, we do so based on
reasons rather than acting of out of the blue. Importantly, we have the
freedom to decide to do nothing: we are not required to act. This ele-
ment is often missing in previous research, as participants are usually
required to act on every single trial. Focusing only on one or two out of
three phases of intending may lead to incomplete datasets that may fail
to capture the full story behind an intended act. Moreover, although the
neural correlates underlying these phases have received some attention,
the potential differences in awareness of these phases has been left
largely unexplored. With the exception of Soon et al. (2008), who in-
vestigated the timing of the awareness of the what and when phase se-
parately, all studies seem to assume that there is only a general
awareness of intending to act, ignoring potential differences in the
timing of the subjective experience of the what, when and whether
components. Linking the subjective experience of these components
with the underlying neural correlates may increase our understanding
of human motor cognition. Free Wally can be used as a tool to do so.
1.3. Measuring the timing of a conscious intention to act
To measure the subjective timing of the what, when or whether
phases of intending to act, Free Wally adopts the probe method de-
signed by Matsuhashi and Hallett (2008). While a participant is playing
Free Wally, an auditory probe may be presented at a pseudo random
moment in time. When at the moment a probe is presented, the player:
a. Experienced an intention to act; they should cancel (veto) their ac-
tion and wait for the next trial to start
b. Did not experience an intention to act; they should ignore the beep
and continue the game.
Every time that a player did not intend to act during a trial, they are
asked to confirm whether or not they vetoed their action in response to
the probe that was presented during that trial. By looking at the timing
of all probes that were ignored by a player and followed by an action,
one can infer the time range relative to action onset during which a
player experienced an intention to act: the distribution of ignored
probes will show a gap prior to action onset. During this period, pre-
sented probes were followed by a veto response, indicating that the
participant experienced an intention to act at that moment in time.
Matsuhashi and Hallett used this strategy to investigate the subjective
timing of the when phase of intending to act. However, one could easily
adopt this strategy to measure the timing of the awareness of the what
and whether phases. To investigate the what phase, the player would
need to veto their action when a probe is presented at a time when they
know what action they intend to perform. To investigate the whether
phase, the player would be instructed to revert their decision to act or
not act when a probe is presented at a time when they decided whether
or not to act: i.e. the player should act when they decided not to act, or
veto when they decided to act. After every action, the participant would
be asked to confirm whether or not they reverted their whether decision
due to a probe. Unlike Libet's clock method, the probe method is in-
sensitive to potential post-hoc influences of action execution or con-
sequence on the reported timing of an intention because all intention
reports are collected prior to action onset (Verbaarschot et al., 2019).
1.4. Comparing spontaneous and deliberate actions
As a first step, we test Free Wally against another game called the
“Object Game”, which mimics the traditional designs of previous re-
search and measures self-paced actions. The stimuli are made similar to
Free Wally, in terms of their appearance and behavior, but lack any
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meaning: the actions are unreasoned and have no consequences.
Therefore, the Object Game measures spontaneous actions: actions based
on urges. In contrast, Free Wally measures deliberate actions: intended
actions that are done for reasons and have consequences. To investigate
whether the most frequently claimed results of previous research hold
within the more ecological valid setting of our Free Wally game, we
measure the timing of only the when phase of intending. In addition, we
measure the (lateralized) readiness potential (Haggard and Eimer,
1999; Kornhuber and Deecke, 1965; Shibasaki and Hallett, 2006;
Verbaarschot et al., 2015) and 8–30 Hz event-related desynchronization
(ERD) (Pfurtscheller and Berghold, 1989) across the (pre)supplemen-
tary motor area. The readiness potential (RP) can start up to 2s prior to
movement onset and consists of a slowly decreasing negative potential
that is maximal over the vertex (i.e. Cz). Around 500ms prior to
movement onset, the RP is most negative on the contralateral side of the
hand that is about to move. Similar to the RP, the 8–30 Hz ERD is
visible up to 2s prior to movement onset and becomes more pronounced
around 500ms on the contralateral side to the hand that is about to
move. Whereas the early part of the RP and 8–30 Hz ERD are thought to
be predictive of when a person will move, the late parts also indicate
what movement a person will perform (Pfurtscheller and Berghold,
1989; Shibasaki and Hallett, 2006).
The exact relationship between these brain signals and the experi-
ence of an intention to move or the performance of a movement re-
mains unclear (Mele, 2010; Radder and Meynen, 2013). Both the (L)RP
and 8–30 Hz ERD have been used to detect voluntary movement onset
in real-time (e.g. Bai et al., 2011; Lew et al., 2012; Schultze-Kraft et al.,
2016). However, although some predictions occur shortly
(620–100ms) prior to movement onset, many (around 45%) motor
intentions are missed or are “predicted” after movement onset. This
suggests that self-paced movements are at least not consistently pre-
ceded by a detectable (L)RP or 8–30 Hz ERD. Although these brain
signals may not be sufficient or necessary for movement performance,
they do seem to correlate to some degree with the experience of an
intention to move. For example, the RP specifically precedes self-paced
voluntary movement, but not involuntary or cued movement
(Jahanshahi et al., 1995; Shibasaki and Hallett, 2006). Moreover, the
RP increases with intentional engagement and decreases with mental
indifference (Kornhuber and Deecke, 1965). Lastly, the RP is visible
prior to a moment at which a person reports experiencing an intention
to move, even in absence of movement performance (Verbaarschot
et al., 2019). Investigating the (L)RP and 8–30 Hz ERD prior to spon-
taneous and deliberate intended movements may further increase our
understanding of these signals in relation to the experience of an in-
tention to move.
By comparing Free Wally and the Object Game, differences in neural
preparation for- and awareness of-intentions between spontaneous and
deliberate movements are investigated. With this data, we aim to verify
that actions are experienced as more deliberate than spontaneous in
Free Wally compared to the Object Game. Moreover, we will verify that
Free Wally does not determine a single “correct” action, having parti-
cipants perform a variety of possible actions across identical situations
in the game, thus measuring self-paced voluntary actions rather than
cue-based actions. We further investigate the influence of stimulus
dependence on the neural preparation- and experienced intention-to act
using Free Wally. Specifically, we investigate whether there is a dif-
ference in the (L)RP/8-30 Hz ERD or the timing of an experienced in-
tention between Free Wally trials that have a clear optimal action (i.e.
one action has the highest reward) and those that do not (i.e. all pos-
sible actions lead to more or less equal rewards). Although we do not
expect any differences in the neural preparation for movement because
the performed movements are identical between games (i.e. self-paced
left- and right-hand button presses), we do expect potential differences
in experience of an intention to act. Free Wally requires active rea-
soning about the current game situation with a long-term goal in mind,
whereas the Object Game requires explicit attention to the occurrence
of spontaneous intentions. Perhaps it is easier to report the timing of an
intention to act when there are reasons to act (Free Wally), leading to a
clearly defined period in time during which vetoes are performed in
response to a probe. In absence of these reasons (Object Game), it may
be difficult to determine the onset of an intention, providing a very
broad window in time during which vetoes are performed. If the (L)RP
(and possibly 8–30 Hz ERD) are indeed sensitive to differences in the
experience of an intention to act (as suggested above), a difference in
these signals may be observed between Free Wally and the Object
Game.
1.5. Testing Free Wally
In this first experiment, we aim to verify Free Wally as a tool to
study ecologically valid intended movements in an experimental con-
text. Although we focus only on the last stages of the neural preparation
for movement (i.e. (L)RP and 8–30 Hz ERD) and measure the timing of
only the when phase of an experienced intention, Free Wally is suitable
for further research into the formation and content of motor intentions.
Specifically, Free Wally is designed to disentangle the neural prepara-
tion and subjective experience of the what, when and whether phases of
intending to act. Disentangling these phases will further advance our
understanding of human cognition and may benefit the development of
brain-controlled prosthetic devices or rehabilitation techniques. If we
can detect what movement a person wants to perform at the moment
that they experience an intention to do so on the basis of brain activity,
we can use this to develop e.g. a prosthetic arm that moves only when a
user intends to move. For these devices to work outside of a controlled
scientific environment, one needs to acquire datasets that are re-
presentative of real-life situations, thus measuring deliberate rather
than spontaneous intended actions.
2. Materials and methods
2.1. Experimental design
Two computer games are tested in a between-subject experiment1:
the Object Game and Free Wally. During the experiment, participants
are seated on a comfortable chair in front of a table inside a quiet room.
A 17-inch TFT screen with a resolution of 800 by 600 pixels and a
refresh rate of 60 Hz is used to present stimuli at a distance of roughly
70 cm in front of the participant (visual angle: 12°). Both games are
controlled via a button box with 5 buttons. Probes are presented
through speakers. Experimental control is done in BrainStream.2
Participants are trained on at least 10 trials of their (randomly as-
signed) target game until they completely understand its rules. After
this, the participants complete another training block of at least 20
trials. This block is used to collect some initial data on their action
distribution, which is used to create an initial probe distribution. The
probes are used to investigate the timing of the awareness of intending
to act while playing either game. Each game contains a total of 36
unique trials in terms of stimuli appearance and behavior (see
Supplementary Material A). During testing, these trials are repeated 4
times per participant in a random order, adding up to 144 trials per
participant. Each test block contains at least 15 trials and takes about
5min to complete. At the end of the experiment the participants com-
plete a short questionnaire on their subjective experience during the
1 Pilot tests were conducted in a within-subject fashion, where participants
played both games. However, the experiment was too long (> 2 h) to be con-
ducted like this without leading to fatigue. Because Free Wally is intended to
measure ecologically valid intended actions in an engaging and fun way, this -in
our opinion-implies limiting the amount of time that a participant needs to sit
still and pay attention (as is required when measuring EEG).
2 See www.brainstream.nu.
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game. In total, the experiment takes about 1 h and 40min.
During the experiment, EEG data is collected using 64 Ag/AgCl
active electrodes sampled at 512 Hz, placed according to the
International 10/20 system. 4 Electro-oculogram (EOG) electrodes are
placed in bipolar pairs above and below the left eye and on the outer
sides of both eyes. Furthermore, an electro-myogram (EMG) is recorded
from two bipolar electrode pairs on the wrist and the center of the left
and right forearm (flexor pollicis longus).
2.1.1. Free Wally
Free Wally is a 2D game made in Unity3 (see Fig. 1), designed to
generate deliberate actions in an artificial environment. The exact in-
structions for participants are provided in Supplementary Material B. In
the game, participants try to free a whale called Wally that is held
captive on top of a hill. Every ‘day’ in the game (corresponding to a trial
in the experiment), 5 people appear on each side of the hill. Initially,
these people are grey (see Fig. 3). Over time, they show their identity by
changing color: friends turn green and hunters turn red. Hunters try to
strengthen the cage and friends try to break it down. Wally has one
defense mechanism: once each day, he (the participant) can decide to
shoot water from his blowhole in order to flush away all the people on
one side of the hill and prevent them from approaching the cage. When
Wally shoots water, the identity of all the people is revealed. Wally does
not need to shoot but can also do nothing. When either all the people
have revealed their identity, or after Wally has shot, all remaining
people will start walking towards the cage.
Over time, hunters get stronger and friends get weaker, which is
displayed by them growing or shrinking in size. Their strength de-
termines how many (between 0 and 2) bars they can remove from, or
add to, the cage. Due to this time penalty, there is a trade-off between
waiting to gather enough information to make a sensible act, and acting
to prevent hunters from gaining power and friends from growing weak.
It takes multiple days to free Wally from his cage. However, Wally can
only survive 15 days without water. If he shoots, his water supply runs
out faster: Wally has enough water to shoot 10 times. This means that
the participant has to take Wally's water supply into account when
deciding whether or not to act.
In order to minimize eye artifacts, a fixation cross is displayed in the
middle of the hill while the people reveal their identity. The game
window is small enough that participants can see all people while
keeping their eyes fixed on the fixation cross. While the fixation cross is
visible, the only things that are animated are Wally (wagging his tail
and blinking every once in a while) and the sea (flowing from left to
right). In 12 out of all 36 unique trials (see Supplementary Material A),
Wally will shortly whistle (animated with musical notes, without
sound) or cry during this period, for additional motivation of partici-
pants. Once the participant acts or all people are revealed, the fixation
cross disappears and the people start walking towards the cage. When
they have added or removed their bar(s), the people vanish into thin
air.
Free Wally implements all aspects (as described in Section 3.1.1)
that we believe are necessary to study deliberate action in an ecologi-
cally valid way:
1. Goal: in Free Wally, participants can choose to free Wally or let him
dehydrate. Moreover, participants will play multiple runs (± 10 to
15) of Free Wally during the experiment to try and break a (fake)
high score across these runs.
2. Strategy: participants need to come up with a strategy on whether or
not to act, when to act and what action to perform.
3. Deliberation: Free Wally evokes actions that are in-between self-in-
itiated and stimulus-response: although stimuli provide reasons to
act, they do not lead to a specific action. Specifically, stimuli provide
reasons to decide whether or not to act, what action to perform and
when to act, but avoid a clear stimulus-response design in which
certain stimuli directly cue a certain action. The participant has to
come up with their own course of action based on the information
that is available to them, i.e. they go through a problem-solving
process to reach an optimal choice of action. They may not be
conscious of this deliberation process, but once they have acted,
they should be able, e.g. when asked, to describe their reasons for
acting in terms of the presented stimuli. In order to create stimuli
that do not provide a direct cue for a specific action, we im-
plemented certain equivocal phases into the game:
- Equal ratio of friends/hunters on both sides of the hill. For ex-
ample, if there are 3 hunters on the left and 3 on the right of the
hill, shooting left or right is optimal.
- Random order of revealing friends/hunters. For example, if 2
hunters are revealed on the left side of the hill, you might be in-
clined to shoot left. However, it can be the case that another 3
hunters will be revealed on the right of the hill, which would make
a shot to the right more optimal.
- Time penalty: friends get weaker over time and hunters get
Fig. 1. “Wally is a sad little whale. He has been captured on top of a hill. Wally
wants to break free and join his friends in the sea. But he can't because hunters
are building a cage around him. Fortunately, he also has some friends who try
to break down the cage. Wally (you) can try to flush away the hunters by
shooting water from his blowhole. However, he has to be careful not to flush
away his friends …” (fragment from Free Wally instructions).
Fig. 2. “This game is set on a hill along a sea side. On top of the hill, is a red
moving object in the shape of a star. Each round, grey objects will appear on the
hill. Over time, these grey objects can change in size and receive a certain color.
The objects, their size and color have no meaning. They do not matter. Your
task during this game is to press button 1 or 5 whenever you feel like it. …
Important: let the intention to act be the only incentive to act. In other words,
do not let the game influence your button presses in any way …” (fragment of
Object Game instructions). (For interpretation of the references to color in this
figure legend, the reader is referred to the Web version of this article.)
3 www.unity3d.com.
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stronger. There is a tradeoff between waiting until you have en-
ough information in order to act sensibly and acting early in order
to prevent weak friends and strong hunters. Participants must
decide for themselves when the time is right to act.
4. Intention: Free Wally is designed in such a way that it provides input
for the what, when and whether phases of intending (Brass and
Haggard, 2008; Verbaarschot et al., 2016). The what phase corre-
sponds to deciding to shoot water to the left or right side of the hill:
this corresponds to a left- or right-hand button press. This decision
can be based on the ratio of hunters and friends that are visible on
the left and right side of the hill. The when phase corresponds to
deciding to shoot water at a specific time. This decision can be based
on the current amount of information about the people's identity
and the size of the revealed friends and hunters. The whether phase
concerns the decisions about whether or not to act during a certain
day (in the game). This whether decision can be based both on the
amount of water that Wally has left before he dehydrates, and the
ratio of revealed friends and hunters. In this experiment, a probe
method (Matsuhashi and Hallett, 2008) is used to measure the
timing of the awareness of the when phase of intending.
5. Action: Free Wally could involve both immediate and postponed
actions.
6. Outcome: the outcome of an intended action within Free Wally is a
button press, leading to the visualization of Wally shooting water to
the corresponding side of the hill and the disappearance of all
people on that side.
7. Consequences: every action can lead to certain evaluative or emo-
tional experiences: a sense of doing well or badly, feeling happy to
have washed away many hunters and being closer to your goal,
feeling sad because you could not yet free Wally, etc.
By implementing these aspects, we create an experimental setting in
which intended actions are made for a reason and involve some con-
sequence: two ingredients that we believe are especially important for
considering experimental actions that could plausibly be performed in
daily life.
Reinforcement learning is one plausible strategy that humans may
adopt for learning and decision making (Cohen and Ranganath, 2007).
Therefore, we believe that the outcome of such a model will be (at least
partially) representative of the expected human behavior in Free Wally.
We used reinforcement learning to set a time penalty and to identify the
optimal order for revealing friends and hunters. To do so, a matrix with
all possible game states was defined. Each state was defined as [nr.
friends left, nr. hunters left, nr. friends right, nr. hunters right], where
each number corresponds to the total amount of revealed friends and
hunters on the left and right site of the hill. In addition, the set of all
possible actions included: shooting water to the left of the hill, shooting
water to the right of the hill and waiting for the next reveal (i.e. state).
A transition matrix defined how to navigate through all possible states
using all possible actions. A reward matrix determined the reward of
each state: where you get a reward for each friend that reaches the cage
and an equal punishment for each enemy that reaches the cage.
Through a series of iterations, a value matrix (initially set to zero) was
continuously updated, learning the associated rewards of performing a
certain action in a certain state. The value matrix was updated until the
total reward across all possible states and actions did not change more
than 0.001 between two subsequent iterations.
Once the value matrix was learned, it was used to identify the
Fig. 3. Screenshots of Free Wally (A–F) and the Object Game (G–L). A, At the start of a ‘day’ in Free Wally, the current day and water supply (i.e. the remaining
number of shots) are indicated. B, Initially, all people are grey. C, At random intervals between 0.5 and 1.5s, people reveal their identity: friends turn green and
hunters turn red. Over time, the hunters grow stronger and the friends grow weaker, which is reflected by their size. During this time, a probe can be presented. When
the participant is not experiencing an intention to act at that moment in time, they can simply ignore it. D, By pressing a button with their left or right hand, the
participant can have Wally shoot water to the left or right side of the hill. This shot will wash away all people on that side of the hill. As soon as the participant presses
a button, the fixation cross disappears. E, At the end of a day, the remaining people walk up the hill: friends will remove bars from the cage and hunters will add bars.
How many bars are added or removed depends on the strength of the hunter or friend (ranging from 0 to 2 bars). F, Eventually, the goal of the game is to break the
cage down completely and have Wally return to the sea. G, At the start of a round in the Object Game, the total number of played rounds is indicated. H, Initially, all
objects are grey. I, At random intervals between 0.5 and 1.5s, objects receive a color: rectangles turn purple and hexagons turn orange. Over time, the hexagons
increase in size, while the rectangles decrease in size. During this time, a probe can be presented and followed by an ignore or veto response. J, During I, the
participant is free to perform a button-press with their left or right hand. K, Once the participant presses a button, the fixation cross disappears and the game will
continue for another 0–8s. L, After 10 rounds the game ends, which is displayed on the screen. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the
reader is referred to the Web version of this article.)
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optimal order of successive states: an order of friend/hunter reveals
that induces ambiguity in action choice (the what phase of intending)
over time. The sequences of reveals (i.e. states) of which the best and
second-best actions maintained equal rewards across multiple friend
and hunter reveals were selected. In addition, the reinforcement
learning paradigm was repeated using several possible time punish-
ments. For each [state, action] pair of the value matrix, a time penalty
was subtracted such that the longer you wait, the stronger the hunters
get and the weaker the friends. The optimal time penalty was chosen
such that a decision to wait or act would be equally probable for as long
as possible within the possible sequences of reveals.
2.1.2. Object Game
Similar to Free Wally, the Object Game is also a 2D game made in
Unity (see Fig. 2). In contrast to Free Wally, the Object Game is de-
signed to measure spontaneous self-initiated actions that are performed
independently of the presented stimuli (mimicking the most well-
known studies on intended action: Libet et al., 1983; Soon et al., 2008;
Bode et al., 2011; Fried et al., 2011). In order to evoke similar visual
artifacts, the stimuli are made as similar as possible to those of Free
Wally in terms of their shape, size and behavior (see Fig. 3). The exact
instructions for participants are provided in Supplementary Material B.
Once every round (corresponding to a trial in the experiment), parti-
cipants are free to press a button with their left or right hand whenever
they want to. They do not need to act every round and can also decide
to do nothing. While doing so, participants view a scene consisting of a
big red star sitting on top of a hill surrounded by 10 rectangles and
hexagons that turn purple or orange over time (see Fig. 3). The rec-
tangles decrease in size while the hexagons increase in size. If
participants do not act on a given trial, the trial will end once all objects
have revealed their color. To minimize eye artifacts, participants are
instructed to look at a fixation cross displayed at the middle of the hill
(similar to Free Wally). Once they act, the fixation cross disappears and
the game continues for a random amount of time between 0 and 8s. In
contrast to Free Wally, the Object Game is actually not much of a game
at all as it lacks a storyline and actions have no effect on the game.
2.1.3. Probe method
While playing either game, a short (110ms) auditory beep
(1716 Hz) can be presented at most once every trial (similar to
Matsuhashi and Hallett, 2008). This probe will evoke an intention re-
port on the when phase of intending. When a probe is presented and: (1)
at that moment the participant did not intend to act, then they should
ignore the probe and continue the game, or (2) at that moment the
participant did intend to act, then they should cancel (veto) the in-
tended act and wait for the next day to start. Importantly, participants
veto their action in response to a probe only when they experienced an
intention to act now at that moment in time, i.e. reporting the when
phase of intending, similar to Matsuhashi and Hallett (2008) and to
Libet et al. (1983).
During training, probes times are drawn from a normal distribution
such that, on average, probes are presented 7s± 2s after trial start.
After training, the probe distribution is initialized based on the second
training block. A running mean and standard deviation of the partici-
pant's action times are calculated during the test phase. Based on
Matsuhashi and Hallett (2008) and Verbaarschot et al. (2016), we ex-
pect awareness of intending no earlier than 2s prior to action onset.
Each trial, a minimum cost function takes the current mean and
Fig. 4. Screenshots of Free Wally when a participant does not act during a certain day in the game. C, While the people are being revealed, a probe is presented. D,
After this happens, the participant does not press a button during that day. E, To clarify whether this was due to a veto or whether the participant simply did not
intend to act that day, a question is prompted. F, If the participant confirms that they performed a veto in response to the probe, the current day will be removed from
the game history: G, the next day is reset to the start of the current day. H, If the participant did not intend to act during the day, I, the game will continue and start
from the final situation of the current day.
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standard deviation of the action times, and calculates a distribution of
possible probe times such that: 33% of probes are presented before the
earliest expected onset of intending (probe time < -2s prior to action),
33% of probes are presented while the participant is expected to be
aware of their intention to act (-2s≤ probe time < 0s prior to action)
and 33% of probes are presented after action onset (probe time≥ 0s
prior to action). The probe time for a given trial is drawn randomly
from this distribution. If a participant needs to veto an intended action
due to a probe in Free Wally, that day is removed from the game history
will not count towards their score (i.e. the game will reset to the si-
tuation at the start of that day, see Fig. 4).
2.1.4. Questionnaire
At the end of the experiment, participants fill in a short ques-
tionnaire of 4 open and 15 closed questions on their subjective ex-
perience during the game: see Supplementary Material C for the full
questionnaire. The questions were designed to investigate: (1) whether
participants followed instructions correctly; (2) whether participants
experienced their actions as more deliberate than spontaneous in the
Free Wally game compared to the Object Game; (3) the strategies for
deciding what movement to make, when to move, and whether or not to
move; (4) any differences in the experienced “freedom” of acting be-
tween the two games; and (5) any difficulties that participants may
have had in reporting their intention to act using the probe method. A
two-sided independent samples Wilcoxon Signed Rank test (with a
Bonferroni corrected alpha level of 0.025/15= 0.002) is used to assess
the statistical significance between Free Wally and the Object Game for
each of the 15 closed questions.
2.2. Participants
The experiment is conducted in accordance with the ethical stan-
dards provided by the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki. The study protocol
is approved by the local Ethics Committee of the Faculty of Social
Sciences of the Radboud University in Nijmegen, The Netherlands. 41
Healthy adult participants volunteered to participate in the experiment,
providing their written informed consent. 21 Participants played Free
Wally (mean 27 ± 10 years old, 13 females) and 20 the Object Game
(mean 26 ± 9 years old, 14 females). All participants are right-handed
and have normal or corrected-to-normal vision and hearing. All parti-
cipants reported not to suffer from color blindness.
2.3. Statistical analysis
2.3.1. Probes
The probe method of Matsuhashi and Hallett (2008) is edited to
optimize the probe distribution such that 33% of probes are presented
roughly prior to awareness of intending to act, 33% while a participant
is aware of their intention to act, and 33% after the action is already
performed. To check whether the presented probes indeed follow this
predicted distribution, the timing of predicted and observed probes is
compared. In order to do so, probe times that are followed by a left-
hand action, right-hand action, or veto are extracted relative to trial
start (see Fig. 3-B,-H) across participants. Subsequently, the action
times are subtracted from the corresponding probe times to calculate
the probe timing relative to action onset. The number of probes oc-
curring more than 2s prior to action onset, between 2 and 0s prior to
action onset and after action is calculated as a percentage of all pre-
sented probes. The probes that were followed by a veto are added to the
percentage of probes that fall within 2 to 0s prior to action onset. A two-
sided dependent samples Wilcoxon Signed Rank test (with an alpha
level of 0.025) is used to determine whether the percentages of pre-
dicted and observed probes differ significantly across participants
within each game. Moreover, the percentage of presented probes that
were followed by no action, a veto, or an ignore response are analyzed.
These percentages are compared between games using a two-sided
independent samples Wilcoxon rank sum test (with an alpha level of
0.025).
2.3.2. Actions
The EMG measurement serves to check the timing accuracy of the
button presses. This is done for all left- and right-hand actions sepa-
rately. For analysis, the difference in activity of two bipolar EMG
electrodes is computed and band-pass filtered between 51 and 250 Hz.
Subsequently, the absolute value is taken and the data is sliced in
epochs of−0.5 to 0.5s around a button press. Individual thresholds for
muscle activation are set to the median EMG activity plus 2x the
standard deviation. The average onset of muscle activity is determined
as the point in time at which the average EMG activity exceeds the set
threshold. To investigate whether there are any differences in action
timing (i.e. the timing of a left- or right-handed button press relative to
trial start) between Free Wally and the Object Game, the mean and
standard deviations of the individual action times are compared sepa-
rately between games using an independent samples t-test (alpha level
is set to 0.025).
Lastly, Free Wally is designed to evoke actions that are in-between
self-initiated and stimulus-response. In order to verify whether Free
Wally does not compel one to perform a single optimal action at a single
point in time, the variability in action choice and time was analyzed
across participants in identical situations. For this purpose, we calcu-
lated the mean and standard deviation of the action times relative to
trial start, for each of the 36 unique trials within Free Wally, across
participants. Moreover, for each unique trial, we calculated the per-
centage of left hand, right hand and no action choices across all par-
ticipants. For comparison, the same analysis was performed across the
36 unique trials of the Object Game.
2.3.3. Intentions
Using the probe method, the timing of the awareness of the when
phase of intending was investigated during each game. Differences in
the timing of this awareness are compared between games. In order to
do so, the distribution of scheduled and ignored probes is calculated.
The distribution of scheduled probes indicates how many probes are, on
average, presented to a participant at a certain point in time prior to
action. During the experiment, maximally one probe is selected for
presentation per trial. We simulate running this probe-selection step
multiple times to get a probe distribution relative to action onset. To
determine the distribution of scheduled probes relative to action onset,
the scheduled probe onsets that precede each individual action are
sampled per participant. Subsequently, the action onset is subtracted
from each corresponding sampled probe onset in order to calculate the
probe timing relative to action onset. A histogram with 51 time bins of
100ms, running from 5s prior to action until action onset, is con-
structed of the scheduled probe timings. This histogram is divided by
the total number of actions of a participant to calculate the average
number of presented probes prior to action onset. The distribution of
ignored probes contains the timing of all probes relative to action onset
that were presented and ignored by the participant (indicating that the
participant was not experiencing an intention to act at that moment in
time). Each of these probes is followed by an action at a later point in
time. To get this distribution, a histogram is created of the ignored
probe times using the same bins as those of the scheduled probe dis-
tribution.
The sum of the histograms of scheduled and ignored probes is taken
over all participants per condition, resulting in one distribution of
scheduled probes and one distribution of ignored probes across all
participants per condition. A bootstrap approach (Efron and Tibshirani,
1994) with 10000 repetitions is used to re-generate the histogram of
scheduled and ignored probes across participants. For each bootstrap: a
random sample with replacement of equal length to the original sample
is taken from the scheduled and ignored probe times of each partici-
pant. For each time bin between 5s prior to action until action onset, it
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is investigated whether the number of ignored probes is less than the
number of scheduled probes. In order for two bins to differ sig-
nificantly, the number of ignored probes should be lower than the
number of scheduled probes across 10000-9.804=9990.196 of the
bootstrap samples. The alpha level is Bonferroni corrected for the
number of bins: 50/51= 9.804 (1-sided test).
Furthermore, the distribution of ignored probes is expressed as
percentages of the corresponding distributions of scheduled probes (i.e.
ignored probe distribution/scheduled probe distribution) for each
condition. These distributions of ignored probes are compared between
the two games. The alpha level is set at 250/51= 4.902 (2-sided test).
This means that in order for two bins to differ significantly, the per-
centage of probes in a bin of Free Wally should be consistently higher/
lower than the corresponding bin of the Object Game for 1000-
4.902= 9995.098 of the bootstrap samples.
Lastly, the onset of intending and point of no return are calculated
from the distribution of ignored probes of each bootstrap. The onset of
intending is calculated as the earliest time bin after which the dis-
tribution of ignored probes is consistently lower than that of scheduled
probes. The point of no return is taken as the earliest time bin after the
onset of intending after which the distribution of ignored probes is
consistently higher or equal to the distribution of scheduled probes. The
onset of intending and point of no return were considered to differ
significantly between conditions when they were consistently earlier/
later across 9750 bootstrap samples (2-sided test).
2.3.4. Brain
Analysis of the recorded EEG data is performed using Fieldtrip.4
Preprocessing consists of the following steps: (1) trials are sliced run-
ning from−10 to 5s, time-locked to action onset; (2) trials in which the
participant acted within 4s after trial start are removed to ensure an
artifact free baseline period; (3) the EEG data is re-referenced using a
linked “mastoid” reference (i.e. channels P9 and P10); (4) the EEG and
EOG data are demeaned; (5) EOG artifacts are removed using linear
decorrelation of the EEG and EOG (Gratton, 1998); (6) a band-pass
filter is applied between 0.2 and 47 Hz to filter out slow drifts and 50 Hz
line noise; (7) bad channels are removed (> 3.5 standard deviations
from mean power); (8) bad trials are removed (> 3.5 standard devia-
tions from mean power); (9) bad channel removal is repeated (as sen-
sitivity has been improved by removing bad trials); (10) missing
channels are recreated using spherical spline interpolation (Perrin et al.,
1989); and (11) the EEG is baselined between−3.5 and−2.5s prior to
action onset.
In order to analyze the RP, the event-related potential (ERP) is
calculated per participant and game. A between-subject cluster-per-
mutation test (1000 permutations, alpha= .05) is used to detect any
significant differences between Free Wally and the Object Game across
2.5 to 0s prior to action (Maris and Oostenveld, 2007). To assess dif-
ferences between left and right hand actions, the LRP is calculated for
each participant as: [(C3left - C4left) + (C4right - C3right)]/2 (Trevena and
Miller, 2002), where C3 and C4 are the EEG recordings over the motor
cortex of the left and right hemisphere corresponding to left and right
hand trials. A between-subject cluster-permutation test (1000 permu-
tations, alpha= .05) is used to detect any significant differences in LRP
activity between Free Wally and the Object Game across 0.5 to 0s prior
to action.
In order to analyze the alpha/beta ERD, a spectrogram is calculated
between −5 and 3s around action onset. Frequencies of interest are
defined from 5 to 30 Hz using 2 Hz bins. A flexible Hanning window is
used such that it includes at least 7 cycles of each frequency of interest.
The baseline activity is defined per electrode, frequency, and trial as the
median power between 3.5 and 2.5s prior to action. The data is base-
lined using a relative baseline (where a value of 1 means no signal
change compared to baseline). The ERD is calculated per participant by
taking the median power across trials for each electrode, frequency and
trial. Again, a between-subject cluster-permutation test (1000 permu-
tations, alpha= .05) is used to detect any significant differences be-
tween the spectrograms of Free Wally and the Object Game, averaged
across 8–30 Hz, running from 2.5 to 0s prior to action.
To investigate potential differences in neural preparation prior to
easy and difficult action decisions, under the assumption that difficult
decisions result in more variation in action choice and timing across
trials and participants, Free Wally trials were divided into two cate-
gories: low variance and high variance trials. These low and high var-
iance trials were calculated for each of the what, when and whether
phases related to an intended act. To calculate the low and high var-
iance trials related to the what phase, the 25th and 75th percentiles
were calculated of the percentage of left- and right-hand decisions per
unique trial across participants. The same was done on the percentage
of act and no act trials for the whether phase. To calculate the low and
high variance trials related to the when phase, the 25th and 75th per-
centiles of the standard deviation of action times per unique trial across
participants was calculated. Differences in action choice or standard
deviations in action timing that fall above the 75th percentile were
considered as high variance trials, whereas those that fall below the
25th percentile were considered as low variance trials. Using a within-
subject cluster-permutation test with 1000 permutations, the RP and
alpha/beta ERD are compared between the low and high variance trials
of each phase across 2.5 to 0s prior to action onset (with an alpha level
of 0.025).
3. Results
Eight Participants had to be excluded from the analysis because they
were not following instructions correctly. These participants used the
probes to cheat in Free Wally, always ignored the probes, were counting
time and planning their actions in the Object Game, or were making
decisions based on stimuli in the Object Game. This leaves 33 partici-
pants for analysis: 17 of which played Free Wally.
3.1. Probes
The relative percentages of the predicted and observed probe times
before the awareness of intending, during awareness of intending, and
after action are analyzed for Free Wally and the Object Game (see
Fig. 5A). The median percentages of predicted and observed probes in
Free Wally all roughly approach the expected 33%. However, those of
the Object Game deviate slightly, with less observed probes during
awareness of intending and more after action. The percentage of pre-
dicted and observed probes before awareness of intending is not sig-
nificantly different for both Free Wally (z=1.160, r=0.199, p= .246)
and the Object Game (z=−0.465, r=−0.080, p= .642). Moreover,
the percentage of predicted and observed probes during intending is not
different for Free Wally (z=−1.302, r=−0.223, p= .193), but is
different for the Object Game (z=2.585, r=0.443, p = .010*). Si-
milarly, the percentage of predicted and observed probes after action is
not different for Free Wally (z=−0.592, r=−0.102, p= .554), but is
different for the Object Game (z=−2.275, r=−0.390, p = .023*).
We believe that these differences between the predicted and observed
probes in the Object Game can be explained by the fact that participants
acted faster in the Object Game compared to the Free Wally Game (see
Section 3.1.2). When participants act faster, probes are less likely to
occur during the awareness of intending and more likely to occur after
action.
The percentage of presented probes followed by no action (Free
Wally: 26.38% ± 12.29%; Object Game: 18.17% ± 12.72%), a veto
(Free Wally: 20.65% ± 18.15%; Object Game: 13.53% ± 11.44%) or
an ignore (Free Wally: 52.97% ± 20.14%; Object Game:
68.31% ± 17.52%) response are calculated per game across4 See www.fieldtriptoolbox.org.
C. Verbaarschot, et al. Neuropsychologia 133 (2019) 107156
8
participants (see Fig. 5B). No significant differences are found for the
percentages of probes followed by an ignore (z=−2.035, r=−0.354,
p= .042), veto (z=0.919, r=0.160, p= .358) or no action
(z=1.819, r=0.317, p= .069) response between Free Wally and the
Object Game.
3.2. Actions
Action times correspond to the timing of a left or right handed
button press relative to trial start. Mean action times are calculated per
participant for each game (see Fig. 6A). The standard deviations of the
individual action times are indicated in Fig. 6B. On average 93 (± 24)
actions were measured per participant in Free Wally with a mean action
time of 9.093s (± 1.867s). In the Object game 112 (± 19) actions
were measured on average per participant with a mean action time of
7.340 (± 2.561s). The mean action times are significantly different
between the Object Game and Free Wally (df=31, t=4.5224,
p < .025): the actions in the Object Game are performed earlier than
those in Free Wally. Moreover, the standard deviations of the action
times are significantly different between the Object and Free Wally
game (df=31, t=−4.9015, p < .025): the action times in the Object
Game show a greater spread than those of Free Wally.
The average onset of muscle activity as measured using EMG differs
by −39.637ms (± 60.867ms) for Free Wally and −53.223ms
(± 70.876ms) for the Object Game relative to the button press (see
Fig. 6C). Because this difference is so small (< 100ms) relative to the
action times (< 1%), the button presses are used to time-lock the EEG
data throughout the rest of the analyses.
The variability in action choice and timing across each unique trial
of Free Wally and the Object Game are determined across participants
(see Fig. 7). The percentages of actions vs. no actions (whether) and the
percentages of left vs. right hand actions (what) are investigated. In
Fig. 5. A, Percentages of predicted (pred.) and observed (obs.) probes within Free Wally and the Object Game. The predicted and observed probes can fall in 1 of 3
categories: before the earliest expected awareness of intending to act (< 2s prior to action), during awareness of an intention to act (> 2 and<0s prior to action) or
after action (> 0s). The percentage of predicted and observed probes during intending and after action differed significantly (p < .025) within the Object Game. B, A
probe can be followed by: no action, a veto or an ignore. The distribution of these responses is visualized as a stacked histogram showing the sum of occurrences of
each response across participants for each game.
Fig. 6. A, Distribution of mean action times (relative to trial start) of all participants for the Free Wally and Object Game. The distributions differ significantly
(p < .025). B, Standard deviations of the action times of all participants. The standard deviations differ significantly (p < .025). C, Distribution of median EMG
onsets (relative to the button press) across participants for Free Wally and the Object Game.
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addition, the mean and standard deviation of the action times (when)
are investigated. From Fig. 7, we see that participants are more inclined
to act in the Object Game compared to Free Wally. Furthermore, we see
that the choice for left and right handed action is quite random for the
Object Game and not random for Free Wally. Lastly, we see that the
Object Game has more or less equal variance across the action timings
of all trials whereas Free Wally shows more variability. Overall, these
results show that action timing and choice depend at least to some
extent on the presented stimuli in Free Wally, whereas this is not the
case in the Object Game. Moreover, some trials in Free Wally show
more variance across action choice and timing than others, whereas the
variance is more or less equal across trials in the Object Game. This
indicates that there is not a single optimal action choice and time for
every trial of Free Wally. In other words, Free Wally is not a pure sti-
mulus-response task but requires some form of internal deliberation to
come up with an action strategy to achieve a certain goal based on the
current game situation.
3.3. Intentions
Fig. 8A shows the distribution of scheduled and presented probes
across all participants for Free Wally and the Object Game. For both
games, we observe a dip in the number of ignored probes relative to the
number of scheduled probes between roughly 2 and 0.2s prior to action.
During this time period we know that multiple probes were presented
to participants, but most of these probes were followed by a veto re-
sponse, and create a dip in the histogram of ignored probes. The period
after which vetoes are consistently performed across all participants is
seen as the period during which awareness of intending to act arises.
This period starts at 1.1s prior to action for Free Wally and at 1.3s prior
to action for the Object Game. Subsequently, this period ends at 0.4s
prior to action for Free Wally and the Object Game (see Fig. 8A).
Shortly prior to action, the dip in the number of ignored probes
seems to disappear: the number of ignored probes approaches the
number of scheduled probes again. The time point at which this hap-
pens is referred to as the point of no return (Matsuhashi and Hallett,
2008). At this point of no return, probes are presented so close to action
performance that the participant is no longer able to veto their action.
This point of no return is found at 0.3s prior to action for both Free
Wally and the Object Game. No significant differences are found
3.4. Brain
Fig. 9A shows a grand average of the RP in Free Wally and the
Object Game. In both games, we observe a slowly increasing negative
potential that is maximal over the central motor cortex (Cz), starting
around -2s prior to action onset. The shape and timing of this RP
matches those found in previous research (Libet et al., 1983; Shibasaki
and Hallett, 2006; Verbaarschot et al., 2016). A between-subject
cluster-permutation test on the RPs of Free Wally and the Object Game
with a pre-selected time range of−2.5 to 0s prior to action did not find
any significant differences between the two games. Any post-action
differences in the ERP are likely due to differences in stimuli after ac-
tion onset: visualized consequences of acting in Free Wally vs. no
change in stimuli in the Object Game.
Fig. 9C shows a grand average of the LRP in Free Wally and the
Object Game. We observe the LRP as a small positive potential, showing
the difference in neural activity between hemispheres for left- and
right-handed actions. This shape matches that of previous literature
(Trevena and Miller, 2002). On average, the LRP seems to start round
400ms prior to action in the Object Game and a bit later, around
200ms prior to action in Free Wally. However, a between-subject
Fig. 7. Average trial-by-trial variability in action choice and timing across all participants. From the top (whether) plot, it is obvious that participants are more
inclined to act in the Object Game compared to Free Wally. From the middle (what) plot, we see that the choice for left and right handed action is quite random for
the Object Game and not random for Free Wally. The bottom (when) plot shows that the Object Game has more or less equal variance across the action timings of all
days whereas Free Wally shows more variability across days.
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cluster-permutation test on the LRP's of the Free Wally and Object
Game conditions with a pre-selected time range of −0.5 to 0s prior to
action did not find any significant differences between the two games
(see Fig. 9).
Fig. 10 shows a spectrogram of the grand average alpha and beta
activity prior to action in Free Wally and the Object Game. In both
spectrograms, we see a clear ERD starting around 2s prior to action.
Around 0.5s after action, we observe an event-related synchronization
(ERS), confirming previous literature on the alpha/beta signatures re-
lated to movement preparation and performance (Pfurtscheller and
Berghold, A, 1989). A between-subject cluster-permutation test on the
ERD's from 8 to 30 Hz of Free Wally and the Object Game with a pre-
selected time range of −2.5 to 0s prior to action did not find any sig-
nificant differences between the two games.
In order to analyze differences in neural preparation prior to trials
in which actions show more or less variability, high and low variance
trials are selected within Free Wally. Fig. 11 shows the grand average
RP for low and high variance trials of the what, when and whether
phases. The late RP, starting around 0.5s prior to action onset, seems
more pronounced in the low variance what trials than the high variance
ones. Moreover, the low variance whether trials seem to have an earlier
onset of the RP than the high variance ones. No visual difference is
observed in the low and high variance when trials. When looking at the
individual RPs across all phases between the low and high variance
trials (see Fig. 12), the high variance trials seem to show a larger
general variance across participants than the low variance trials.
However, no significant differences are found between the low and high
variance trials across the what, when and whether phases.
Fig. 13 shows the spectrograms of low and high variance trials
across the what, when and whether phases. Although we observe a clear
ERD in the alpha and beta bands for low variance trials, we only see a
very vague ERD for the high variance trials. This difference seems most
expressed for the what and whether phases, and is confirmed by a be-
tween-subject cluster permutation test (p < .025). No significant dif-
ference is found between low and high variance trials of the when
phase.
3.5. Questionnaire
The full questionnaire and accompanying answers can be found in
Supplementary Material C. On average, participants judged their ac-
tions to be more spontaneous in the Object Game and more deliberate in
Free Wally (see Fig. 14A). “Spontaneous” was interpreted as acting
randomly, impulsively, immediately, without strategy, without con-
sideration, without control, irrespective of presented stimuli or based
on feeling. “Deliberate” was interpreted as pre-meditated, intentional,
with consideration, with control, related to stimuli or in line with a
certain strategy. Although internal deliberation was important for acting
in both Free Wally and the Object Game (see Fig. 14B), the current game
situation was judged to be more important for acting in Free Wally than
the Object Game (see Fig. 14C).
Most participants in Free Wally used some strategy to decide
Fig. 8. A, The top and middle plot show the distribution of scheduled and ignored probes summed across all participants per game. The asterisk(*) indicates
significant differences between the ignored and scheduled probes across the 10000 bootstrap samples. The bottom plot shows the percentage of ignored probes
relative to the number of scheduled probes across all participants per game. These percentages can be greater than 100% in cases where the number of presented and
ignored probes exceeded the number of expected (scheduled) probes. Standard deviations are indicated in grey. B, Mean and standard deviation of the onset of
intending and point of no return across the 10000 bootstraps per game.
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whether or not to act (see Fig. 14E). Reported strategies include: shoot if
there are more hunters than friends, always act, be more inclined to
shoot when the cage is large, act when there or more than 2 hunters on
one side of the hill, etc. Even though participants were instructed to act
spontaneously and unrelated to the stimuli, some (3) participants in the
Object Game still used some strategy to decide whether or not to act.
These strategies include: deciding beforehand whether or not to act
during the trial, not act if an itch was experienced, act if there are 2
Fig. 9. A, Grand average RP at electrode Cz for Free Wally and the Object Game, including a topoplot of the grand average RP from−0.5 to 0s. B, Grand average RP
on top of all individual RPs per participant for Free Wally and the Object Game. C, Grand average LRP for Free Wally and the Object Game. between the distributions
of ignored probes of Free Wally and the Object Game (see Fig. 8A). Furthermore, no significant differences were found between the onset of intending or point of no
return between Free Wally and the Object Game (see Fig. 8B).
Fig. 10. A, Grand average ERD for Free Wally and the Object Game at electrode Cz. B, Topoplot of the ERD from −1 to 0s of Free Wally and the Object Game.
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orange objects at the start of a trial. A similar observation is made for
the decision on what action to perform: most participants used a
strategy in Free Wally, whereas most participants in the Object Game
acted randomly (See Fig. 14E). For Free Wally, the reported strategies
on what action to perform largely overlap with those reported for de-
ciding whether or not to act. In addition, four out of twenty participants
reported some strategy for deciding what action to perform in the Ob-
ject Game: switch between button 1 and 5, only press button 5, ex-
perienced an urge to act when an object popped up fast, felt a pre-
ference for button 5 and actively pressed button 1 every once in a while.
The majority of participants reported to decide randomly when to act
during both Free Wally and the Object Game (see Fig. 14E). Strategies
that were used and reported in Free Wally include: shoot when 3 people
are revealed, act faster if the cage is large, act faster if there are only a
few days left, wait as long as possible, etc. Strategies reported in the
Object Game include: act based on the reveal of objects, or act after a
certain number of pre-defined seconds.
Most participants felt largely in control over Wally's fate (see
Fig. 14D). Moreover, most participants felt moderately or completely
free to do what they wanted during both games (see Fig. 14F). Simi-
larly, most participants felt moderately or very responsible for their
actions or the outcome of their actions in both games (see Fig. 14G).
Although Free Wally aroused either positive or negative emotions (but
not much in-between), the Object Game mostly aroused mostly nothing,
or only mild negative or positive emotions (see Fig. 14H).
Lastly, in Free Wally some participants perceive the probes as
stressful (3 participants), unfair (1 participant) or as a means to cheat
the game (2 participants). In the Object Game some participants per-
ceived the probes as stressful (2 participants), loud (1 participant),
frustrating (1 participant), or unexpected (1 participant). Most
Fig. 11. Grand average RP for low and high variance what, when and whether trials of Free Wally.
Fig. 12. Individual RPs across electrode Cz for low and high variance what, when and whether trials of Free Wally. The grand average RP is shown in blue (low
variance) and green (high variance). (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the Web version of this article.)
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participants sometimes ignored the beeps in Free Wally, whereas they
did not do so in the Object Game (see Fig. 14I).
4. Discussion
In this experiment, participants played one of two computer games
that measured their intended actions within an artificial environment.
One of them, Free Wally, was designed to measure deliberate actions
that are performed for a reason and involve some consequence. In the
game, participants are responsible for accepting to attempt to free
Wally as their goal, and for selecting, evaluating and executing an ac-
tion strategy to achieve that goal. Moreover, in contrast to previous
Libet-style paradigms, Free Wally provides input to each of the what,
when and whether phases of intending. The other, the Object Game,
measures spontaneous actions that are performed independently of
presented stimuli, have no consequences and serve no goal. These urge-
based actions are similar to those studied previously in the field of
neuroscience (e.g. Libet et al., 1983; Bode et al., 2011), but may lack a
clear conscious intention to act and may not resemble the intended
actions for which we take or are assigned responsibility to in daily life.
To investigate whether the results of previous research hold within the
more ecologically valid context of Free Wally, the deliberate actions of
Free Wally were compared to the spontaneous actions of the Object
Game. Specifically, differences in the neural preparation for action (i.e.
LRP, RP, alpha/beta ERD) and the timing of the when phase (i.e. con-
sciously deciding to act now) of intending to act were compared be-
tween Free Wally and the Object Game.
Both games seem to have been successful in measuring the two
targeted types of intended action. Participants rated their actions in
Free Wally as mostly deliberate, while those in the Object Game rated
theirs as mostly spontaneous. Moreover, participants indicated that the
current game situation was important to the timing and choice of their
actions in Free Wally, whereas this was not the case for the Object
Game. This was confirmed by the measured variability of actions within
the unique trials of both games: the variability in action choice and
timing was quite consistent across the unique trials of the Object Game,
but it clearly differed between the unique trials of Free Wally. This
suggests that participants were indeed using the presented stimuli as
reasons for acting in Free Wally, whereas they acted mostly in-
dependent of the presented stimuli in the Object Game. Moreover,
participants reported specific strategies on the what and whether phases
of intending within Free Wally, whereas they indicated to act mostly
random during the Object Game.
Although our behavioral data suggests that action timing depends
more on stimulus presentation in Free Wally than the Object Game,
participants report to choose the timing of their actions mostly ran-
domly in both games. This is perhaps not surprising, since Free Wally
was designed to include certain equivocal phases that prevent actions
from becoming purely stimulus-response (see Section 2.1.1). This
means that the timing of actions is not dictated by a clear stimulus,
which may lead to a more or less random time of acting once decisions
on whether or not to act and what action to perform have been made.
Therefore, one could argue that the decision on when to act is more
spontaneous than deliberate, creating similar conditions on when to act
in both Free Wally and the Object Game. However, even though par-
ticipants may not be able to report a clear stimulus as a reason for their
decision on when to act in Free Wally, we believe their action timing is
not completely spontaneous: in Free Wally, one needs to wait until
enough information is revealed to make a reasonable decision to act. In
other words: action timing matters in Free Wally. This is not the case for
the Object Game, in which we believe that choices on action timing are
completely spontaneous.
No significant differences were found between the Object Game and
Free Wally in terms of brain signals or the timing of the awareness of
the when phase of intending to act. The RP, LRP and alpha/beta ERD all
confirm previous research, considering their shape and timing.
Furthermore, awareness of the when phase of intending was found, on
average, up to 1.3s prior to action for the Object Game, and 1.1s for
Free Wally (similar to Matsuhashi and Hallett, 2008 and Verbaarschot
et al., 2016). This suggests that at least the last stages prior to action
performance are similar between spontaneous and deliberate actions in
terms of their neural preparation for action and awareness of when to
act. In other words, increasing the ecological validity of the experi-
mental context did not affect any results compared to those of previous
research. Some researchers may find this surprising, as the brain signals
and timing of a conscious intention to act are often expected (or hoped)
to differ between spontaneous and deliberate actions in order to ‘save’ a
libertarian notion of free will (Saigle et al., 2018). However, since the
performed movement is identical between the two games, we would
also not expect to find any differences in these final stages of intended
action that seem to concern action preparation mostly.
The current study focused only on the (L)RP and 8–30 Hz ERD.
Although we may not expect any differences in these brain signals be-
tween spontaneous and deliberate actions, we may expect to find
Fig. 13. Grand average ERD of electrode Cz for low and high variance what, when and whether trials. Both the low and high variance what and whether trials differ
significantly from each other (p < .025).
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differences in brain signals that are related to intention formation and
selection. Activity in frontopolar cortex, precuneus, and posterior cin-
gulate cortex has been found predictive of action outcome up to 8s in
advance of movement onset (Soon et al., 2008; Bode et al., 2011).
Moreover, different frontal regions seem responsible for each of the
what, when and whether phases of an intended act (Brass and Haggard,
2008; Brass et al., 2013). Specifically, Zapparoli et al., (2017) found a
rostro-caudal gradient within the medial prefrontal cortex, where more
anterior regions (right anterior cingulum, right anterior insula) are
related to abstract decisions of whether or not to act, and posterior re-
gions are involved in determining what action will be performed
(middle cingulum, supramarginal gyrus) and when it will be performed
(supplementary motor area, frontal operculum). In future research, we
will focus on these brain regions to assess potential differences in the
what, when, and whether phases of intending between the Object Game
and Free Wally.
We did expect to find some differences in subjective experience
between the two games in terms of responsibility, experienced freedom
and vividness of intending. However, this was not the case. In both
games, participants reported to feel free to do what they wanted, felt
responsible for their actions, and experienced their intentions as mod-
erately vivid to vivid. We did find a difference in the level of emotions
that each game evoked in their players: whereas Free Wally evoked
either positive or negative emotions, the Object Game was experienced
as mostly neutral. This confirms that at least in Free Wally, participants
were engaged in the consequences of their actions and committed to
their goal. This is strengthened by the fact that most participants in-
dicated that they felt in control over Wally's fate.
Fig. 14. Overview of questionnaire results across 21 participants of Free Wally and 20 of the Object Game. Note: (D) is about whether participants felt in control over
Wally's fate, therefore no results on the Object Game are presented. Significant differences (p < .002) are indicated with a grey rectangle. For the full questionnaire
and accompanying answers, see Supplementary Material C.
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Our findings contradict those of Maoz et al. (2017), who conducted
a similar study comparing the ERP activity prior to arbitrary and de-
liberate decisions. In their study, participants chose, on a per-trial basis,
which one out of two non-profit organizations they would like to donate
money to. In “deliberate” trials, the chosen organizations would ad-
vance to a lottery at the end of each experimental block, where they
could win a 20 dollar donation. Furthermore, each winning organiza-
tion would advance to a between-subject lottery, where they could win
an additional 1000 dollar donation. In “arbitrary” trials, the organiza-
tions of one random trial would both receive 10 dollars at the end of
each experimental block. The randomly selected trials would further
advance to a between-subject lottery where two organizations of a
randomly selected trial would both receive 500 dollars. In other words,
the participant's choice did not matter in arbitrary trials, as randomly
selected organizations would receive an equal amount of money. In
both arbitrary and deliberate trials, participants were instructed to act
(i.e. press a button with their left or right hand) as soon as they made
their decision. In contrast to our study, Maoz et al. found a clear RP
prior to arbitrary but not prior to deliberate decisions. Similar to our
study, the LRP was equally visible prior to both arbitrary and deliberate
decisions.
Prior to the experiment of Maoz et al., participants were asked to
rate all participating organizations, pre-defining the participant's pre-
ferences across organizations at the start of the experiment. During the
experiment, this may lead to a kind of stimulus-response action because
the participant already decided what organizations they prefer over
another: as soon as they see their preferred organization (stimulus),
they act accordingly (response). In other words, there is a clear pre-
decided “optimal” action in the experiment of Maoz et al. that parti-
cipants select as soon as they detect it. In contrast, Free Wally did not
include a clear optimal action across all trials, and was specifically
designed to evoke self-paced actions: stimuli were designed in such a
way that multiple actions may receive equal rewards over time, making
the decision on when to act slightly random. The absence of an RP prior
to deliberate decisions in the experiment of Maoz et al. may be due to
the possible stimulus-response nature of the actions: stimulus-response
actions are usually not preceded by an RP, whereas self-paced actions
are (Jahanshahi et al., 1995; Shibasaki and Hallett, 2006).
The questionnaire showed that 14 people often or sometimes
wrongfully ignored the probes in the Free Wally game, whereas only 8
people always or sometimes wrongfully ignored the probes in the
Object Game. We suspect because participants were trying to reach a
goal, they were more likely to ignore the veto instruction in the Free
Wally game compared to the Object Game. In future research, one could
potentially avoid this issue by reversing the veto instruction: in case a
probe is presented at the moment a participant experiences an intention
to act, they should perform the intended act as soon as possible. If they
do not experience an intention at probe onset, they can ignore the probe
and continue the game. This makes the experimental instructions more
intuitive as it avoids the requirement of a veto and any consequences of
having to veto (i.e. resetting the state of Wally's cage to the previous
day). Moreover, it removes the possibility of using the probes as a
means to cheat the game. Although these instructions would not allow
the measurement of the point of no return, they still allow the mea-
surement of the timing of the awareness of intending to act. The actions
that are made in response to a probe (because the participant is aware
of their intention to act) would cause a local change in the distribution
of probes. In contrast to the original design of Matsuhashi and Hallett
(2008), this local change would consist of an increase rather than de-
crease in the number of probes shortly prior to movement onset. In a
short calibration task, one would need to determine how fast partici-
pants are able to respond to a probe, so the movements that are per-
formed in response to a probe can be separated from the movements
that are performed after an ignored probe.
Lastly, we investigated whether the neural preparation for action
differs between easy and difficult action decisions in Free Wally. For
instance, in the case that 5 hunters are revealed on the left of the hill
and 5 friends on the right, the decision to shoot water to the left of the
hill is quite easy. However, in when 3 hunters are revealed on both the
left and right of the hill, the decision to shoot left or right is much
trickier. In cases with an easy decision, the presented stimuli are all
pointing more or less towards one optimal action choice and time.
Therefore, these trials should involve less variance in action choice and
timing across repetitions. In contrast, difficult decisions involve stimuli
that provide evidence for multiple concurring action choices. Therefore,
these trials should show more variance in action choice and timing
across repetitions. Although no significant differences were found be-
tween the RPs of low and high variance trials, significant differences
were found between the ERDs of low and high variance concerning the
what and whether phases of intending. A clear pre-movement ERD is
visible for the low variance what and whether trials, but is much less
pronounced in their high variance counterparts. This result is perhaps
not surprising, as easy action decisions can be more easily planned than
difficult action decisions: whereas more and more evidence is collected
towards a single action choice in easy trials, conflicting evidence in
action choice is gathered in difficult trials.
The easy trials are largely stimulus-driven, whereas the difficult
trials are more dependent on internal deliberation. Although the cur-
rent study examined the difference between these stimulus-driven and
internally deliberated trials to some extent, future research should
make this comparison explicit. One could test a version of Free Wally in
which the identity of all friends and hunters is revealed at the start of a
trial, providing a player with complete information and removing the
time penalty. In this way, the optimal action is stimulus-driven and
dictated by the presented stimuli (although trials in which two possible
actions would receive equal reward should be excluded from this con-
dition). When comparing this stimulus-driven version of Free Wally
with the original game, one can explicitly investigate the element of
intentionality that differs between these conditions.
Although participants were not explicitly instructed to free Wally,
all participants attempted to do so. One could say that the goal of the
game was set, or emotionally coerced upon the participants, by the
stimulus design: the sad looking whale invokes a general desire to help
him. Therefore, it may be debated whether the performed deliberate
actions can be considered “free”, as their overall goal is pre-determined
by the game. However, in daily life, we believe that the context in
which we intend and act will also co-determine our goals and sub-
sequent actions, even though this may be less apparent than in the
simplistic Free Wally game. Importantly, in daily life as well as Free
Wally, the choice of action is not forced upon a person. People are free
to determine their own strategies to reach their goal. Even though a
goal may be context dependent, this -in our opinion-does not make the
performed action less free.
To the best of our knowledge, Free Wally is a first attempt to
measure deliberate actions in an ecologically valid context that pro-
vides information for the what, when and whether phases of intending to
act. Although this study measured only the timing of the awareness of
the when phase of intending, Free Wally can easily be adjusted to
measure the timing of the awareness of the what and whether phases as
well. To measure these phases, players need to veto in response to a
probe when they have consciously decided what action to perform or
whether or not they will act during a certain trial. In this way, Free
Wally can be used to investigate the link between the neural signatures
that have been found predictive of the what, when and whether phases of
an intended act and the timing of subjective awareness of these phases.
With this game as a tool, we hope to enable future research into the
formation and content of ecologically valid intended action.
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